At the time of the incidents we are investigating, Hughes Microelectronics
Division was a division of Hughes Aircraft. Hughes Aircraft in turn was
owned by General Motors, a major automotive corporation. Hughes Aircraft
was originally started in 1932 by the multimillionaire Howard Hughes as
a division of Hughes Tool Company. During World War II, Hughes Aircraft
became the dominant entity and grew to enormous size as a result of its
Defense Department contract to produce radio equipment. After the war, Hughes
branched out into radar systems, radar guided missiles, video and infrared
imaging, and thermal detection. The company was therefore heavily invested
in microelectronics equipment, and began manufacturing its own microelectronics
for its systems. Thus was born Hughes Microelectronics. Hughes was one of
the original players in the rise of the use of computing technology in defense. During the 1980s, Hughes Aircraft was one of the top defense contractors
in the nation. Hughes Microelectronics was producing chips that were used
in at least 73 different military programs during the time from 1985 to
1987. The programs are very important, and lethal systems: F-14, F-15, and
B-52 aircraft, guided missiles, radar systems, satellites and tanks. The
list covers every branch of the military and many other major defense corporations.
The chips that Hughes Microelectronics was manufacturing were shipped to
all these programs as customers. Some "customers" were really other divisions
of Hughes Aircraft, and other customers were other defense contractors who
were using Hughes parts to produce their own systems for the US government
or other purchasers of arms. Multi-year and multi-system contracts of the kind that Hughes Microelectronics
had with the government were worth billions of dollars to Hughes and to
its parent companies. So it was clearly in Hughes best interest to meet
the guidelines of the contracts. Some guidelines, however, can exert more immediate pressure than others.
Customers (including the US military) call and ask where the chips are that
are late, and when they will be delivered. These are immediate questions
and need to be responded to immediately. On the other hand, the outside inspections of the chip manufacturing process
are only scheduled at predictable intervals and are announced in advance.
Most of the inspection of the process of testing is done internally, by
Hughes employees, who report to those who ultimately also have to answer
to the customers who are waiting for late chips. Directors, supervisors, and managers thus have more immediate pressure
on them to "deliver the chips" than to make sure that every test on the
chips is done. This is the reality of the choices that workers like Margaret
Goodearl and Donald LaRue and their supervisors in Hughes Microelectronics
Environmental Testing area were facing. |
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